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A Biographical Approach in Holocaust Research
Derk Venema and Alex Jettinghoff
Review of: The Participants: The Men of the Wannsee Conference, ed. by Hans-Christian 
Jasch and Christoph Kreutzmüller, trans. by Charlotte Kreutzmüller-Hughes 
and Jane Paulick (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017). 354 pp. $19.95 (pb). 
ISBN: 978-1-78533-671-3.
This study concerns the lives and actions of the men who participated in the infamous Wannsee Conference. This is the code name for the meeting on 20 January 1942 of fifteen German high officials in a charming lakeside villa in Berlin, where they discussed, first, the authority over the operations that 
would result in the elimination of the European Jews; and second, the range of people 
that would be targeted in these operations. Ironically, this conference’s notoriety was 
deliberately caused by Eichmann, who tried to play down his own role in it at his trial 
in 1961.
Two general chapters precede the individual biographies. In an introductory 
chapter, Hans-Christian Jasch sums up the events leading up to this meeting, the 
position and background of the participants, and the topics probably discussed by 
them. The following chapter by Mark Roseman provides a short history of Holocaust 
research and contemplates the contribution that ‘Nazi perpetrator studies’ (such as 
this book) can make to existing Holocaust research. Next follows a series of fifteen 
biographical studies of the individual participants.
For readers interested in these people, the biographies offer excellent introductions. 
They refer as far as possible to primary sources, are surprisingly detailed, and cite 
interesting existing literature. The high quality of the contributions is not surprising, 
since the editors have succeeded in bringing together authors who are experts on 
their subjects. Some have published earlier book-length biographies of the ‘perpe-
trator’ they deal with (Bettina Stangneth on Eichmann, Robert Gerwarth on Hey-
drich, Markus Heckmann on Klopfer, Jasch on Stuckart, and Heinz-Jürgen Priamus 
on Meyer); several others have published articles on their subject. What particularly 
adds to the value of the book is that it sheds more light on some hitherto rather shadowy 
personalities in this group, such as Lange, Schöngarth, Meyer, and Neumann.
The structure of the study is less satisfying on two counts. Firstly, the sequence 
of the biographical chapters is curious. The participants seem to be divided into two 
groups. From the introduction by Jasch we learn that the grouping is meant to be 
according to their main occupation, ‘either within the SS or Nazi ministerial bureau-
cracy. Within these groups they have been placed in alphabetical order’ (p. 13). This 
approach has the strange result that the first biography (that of Eichmann) concerns 
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the least important man of the whole group at the time. Eichmann was subordinate 
to Müller, who was in turn subordinate to Heydrich. The dimension of hierarchy is 
entirely ignored. Within the first group the most senior official present was Heydrich, 
who summoned the meeting and apparently dominated it. Moreover, this division 
into groups serves no clear purpose, although it might have done, if, for example, it 
had been articulated that Heydrich considered the first group as supporters (SS) and 
the second as competitors (as Gerwarth suggests, p. 63). This could have raised the 
question as to whether or not Heydrich had a hard time in getting his competitors 
where he wanted them. Addressing this question would also have brought to the sur-
face that, as Roseman acknowledges (p. 31), the division between the SS and the rest 
was a relative one, since several of the ministerial officials (e.g. Klopfer, Stuckart) 
were honorary SS members.
The second issue concerns the book’s contribution to perpetrator scholarship: it 
lacks a concluding chapter. Elements of a conclusion are included in the introduc-
tions by Jasch and Roseman, but conclusions could have been further developed if 
the editors had rallied their authors – at least partially – around a central research 
question. This book stops short of breaking new ground. Roseman retraces the turn 
to the ‘perpetrator’ approach of the Holocaust to circa 2000, with seminal works 
by Ulrich Herbert on Werner Best and by Michael Wildt on the Sipo-SD elite, and 
he lists the interesting interpretations that similar work has produced since then 
(pp. 31-32). So there is reason to contemplate what new insights might be derived 
from this collection of biographies and how they develop existing scholarship. Inter-
estingly, Roseman suggests such a research question in his chapter.1 He points out that 
in this collection of biographies there is ‘a tension that emerges between two opposing 
insights: on the one hand, shared ideas, energy and habitus made the Wannsee Con-
ference possible; on the other, the protagonists had had to make remarkable intellec-
tual and moral journeys from selves for whom, just a few years earlier, a conference 
about genocide would have been inconceivable’ (p. 34). Here his analysis ends, and one 
is left wondering whether the individual studies could have shed more light on the 
circumstances that led these men to make such a radical turn in their thinking and 
act on this ‘mission’.
Existing literature suggests several dynamic circumstances affecting the individual 
attitudes and actions of the group we are considering here. For instance, there was 
the agenda-setting of the Nazi leadership. As Ian Kershaw has established, the highest 
echelon of the Nazi regime, particularly Hitler, had consistently pressed for the 
disappearance of the Jews from the Reich or even Europe.2 The terminology changed 
1  See also: Mark Roseman ‘Beyond Conviction? Perpetrators, Ideas and Action in The Holocaust in Historiograph-
ical Perspective’, in Conflict, Catastrophe and Continuity: Essays on Modern German History, ed. by F. Biess et al 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 83-103.
2  Ian Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 89–116.
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over time from ‘removal’ to ‘annihilation’ at the point of the outbreak of war with 
the United States. This turn in terminology occurred publicly in a Reichstag speech 
on 30 January 1939, an occasion Hitler referred to regularly in later years. A second 
dynamic was the development of the war in the East. According to Wildt, one of the 
major transformative events was the start of Operation Barbarossa, which opened 
mind-boggling opportunities for the liquidation of ‘Jewish Bolshevism’.3 Also, there 
was a semblance of a line of command, transferring authority concerning this issue 
to institutions like the SS organizations. Göring, as the second man in the Reich, was 
the one who (on 31 July 1941) appeared to give a written instruction (mentioned in the 
Wannsee Protokol) to Heydrich to prepare all measures necessary for the ‘final solu-
tion of the Jewish question’; but the draft of the order came from within the RSHA 
(the Reichssicherheitshauptamt), of which Heydrich was Chief.
Roseman states that ‘social forces’ and ‘recognisable societal interests’ surely 
cannot explain participation of intelligent people in ‘horrifically irrational policies’, 
so it must have some mysterious, individual mental origin (p. 23). But this reductio 
ad absurdum is not valid: psychological group dynamics explain what makes people 
participate in behaviour they would have abhorred earlier. Participants develop all 
kinds of conscious and non-conscious rationalizing and justifying mechanisms to 
cope with the cognitive dissonance resulting from the contradiction between their 
previous habits and beliefs, and their current behaviour. These mechanisms are 
familiar: people start believing in ideological legitimations, and convince themselves 
that the victims are guilty, or dangerous, or subhuman. The result is a ‘changed view 
of the victims, changed attitude toward that suffering, and changed self-concept.’4
So, in their own terms, perpetrators act rationally. Calling the actions of Nazis or 
other perpetrators ‘irrational’ does not serve any purpose other than mystification 
and a false sense of a secure distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as if they were not ‘ordi-
nary men’ after all. ‘Rational’ is a relative term, derived from the Latin ratio, meaning 
exactly that: ‘calculated relation’. An action is rational when it serves the purpose 
the actor intends it to serve. What is meant when writers speak of ‘irrational’ Nazi 
actions or policies or ideology, is not that they did not serve the purposes the Nazis 
wanted them to serve, but that they are abhorrent to outsiders. Far from meaning 
a carefully deliberated choice between many possible ideologies from a complete-
ly neutral standpoint, ‘rationalism’ in this context pertains to the way in which the 
3  Michael Wildt, ‘Generational Experience and Genocide’ in Biography between Structure and Agency, ed. by Volker 
R. Berghahn and Simone Lässig (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 143-161.
4  Ervin Staub, The Psychology of Good and Evil. Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 328. See also Israel W. Charny, The Genocide Contagion: How We Commit 
and Confront Holocaust and Genocide (Lanham, NH: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), reviewed in the first issue of 
this journal.
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participants experienced the gradual dynamic process of actions, ideas and rational-
izations developing into ever more radical forms.
The participants’ ‘remarkable intellectual and moral journeys’ are, in the light of 
the psychological rationalizing mechanisms, not that remarkable. But they are fright-
ening, especially in combination with the insight that most people from most walks 
of life, in specific circumstances, are capable of making such a journey. This collec-
tion of biographies is an excellent starting point for further research, moving beyond 
petite histoire and moral voyeurism to entangle the patterns and pathways of the or-
ganization of the Holocaust and the rationalizing mechanisms that facilitated it. A 
focussed investigation of the interaction of attitudes and experiences of the members 
of this group, and the circumstances they had to deal with, might have suggested the 
beginning of an answer to Roseman’s question. Even though the historical sources 
are unlikely to be sufficient to explore this question in the case of every perpetrator, it 
seems probable that they are for some. Not to have tried seems a missed opportunity 
in an otherwise impressive collection of biographies.
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